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The inter-municipal cooperation in Switzerland
and the trend towards amalgamation
Nils C. Soguel*
In Switzerland, the ongoing reforms of fiscal federalism put municipa-
lities under increased fiscal stress. A majority of the municipalities had
responded by increasing the cooperation with neighbouring municipa-
lities over the last few years. Simultaneously, many discuss or are
directly involved in a possible amalgamation project. Accordingly, the
paper aimed at describing how cooperation has presently developed
between Swiss municipalities, in order to illustrate the existing trend
towards amalgamation. Current surveys helped us estimate the
growing importance of inter-municipal arrangements together with
the surge of amalgamations. A further goal was to investigate if
cantonal financial incentives to municipal amalgamation essentially
benefit the cantonal community, following the fiscal equivalence
principle, or if they rather benefit amalgamating municipalities. In
reality, equivalence does not exist. However, this may possibly be the
condition to reduce inequality among amalgamating municipalities.
En Suiza, las reformas relativas al federalismo fiscal han puesto a los
municipios bajo una fuerte presión fiscal. La mayoría de las entidades
han respondido a este fenómeno incrementando la cooperación con los
municipios circundantes. Simultáneamente, los municipios están
discutiendo, o directamente envueltos, en un proyecto de fusión. Por
consiguiente, este trabajo tiene como propósito describir cómo se ha
desarrollado la cooperación en los municipios suizos, con el fin de
ilustrar también la tendencia hacia la fusión. Recientes investigaciones
nos ayudan a estimar el crecimiento de la importancia de los acuerdos
intermunicipales tendentes a la fusión. A la vez, tratamos de
determinar si los incentivos financieros cantonales hacia la amalgama
de municipios benefician esencialmente a la comunidad cantonal,
siguiendo el principio de equivalencia fiscal. En realidad, la
*Swiss graduate school of public administration - Institut de hautes études en admi-
nistration publique (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
 
equivalencia no existe. No obstante, puede ser la condición para
reducir la desigualdad entre las entidades fusionadas
Key words: fiscal federalism, inter-municipal cooperation, amalgamation,
fiscal equivalence
JEL classification: H11, H77
1. Introduction
The federalist organisation of the Swiss government is experiencing
several adjustments to cope with a changing environment. The challenge
is not only to further promote an efficient provision of public services,
but also to improve responsiveness and accountability of politicians
and bureaucrats through a greater democratic and participatory orga-
nisation of governments. This issue has constantly remained on the con-
temporary Swiss political agenda, either at the central or local level. The
fiscal crisis and the rapid growth of public debt since the 1990’s was a
powerful incentive to transform ideas into action. The Swiss Confede-
ration initiated such a movement mutually with the cantons. Meanwhile,
several cantons initiated programmes to adjust their relationships with
municipalities. Within the existing context of fiscal difficulties, each
government level has, to a certain extent, attempted to delegate tasks
and costs to the lower fiscal tier while preserving its responsibility to deci-
ded if the service has to be provided and according to which standards.
As a result, municipalities are subject to additional fiscal pressure. This
pressure is reinforced by an increase in tax competition.
Indeed, delegating the provision of public services to a lower level of
government is difficult for municipalities, since they are at the bottom
of the institutional hierarchy. Therefore, inter-municipal cooperation
became a favoured solution out of the fiscal challenge. The number of
inter-municipal associations or agreements has surged over the pre-
vious years. More recently, a powerful trend towards the amalgamation
of municipalities has also taken place, motivated partially by financial
incentives allocated by certain cantons to improve the attractiveness of
amalgamation.
Consequently, this paper aims to portray how cooperation has recently
developed between Swiss municipalities, illustrating the present trend
towards amalgamation. Two recent surveys of Swiss municipalities help
us estimate the growing importance of inter-municipal arrangements
mutually with the surge of amalgamation discussions and projects. An
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additional objective is to investigate the possibility that cantonal finan-
cial incentives to municipal amalgamations benefit essentially the can-
tonal community, as the fiscal equivalence principle would convey, or
rather benefit amalgamating municipalities. Referring to the later sce-
nario, the equivalence between the payers of the incentives (the canto-
nal tax payer) and the benefiters (all cantonal citizens) would conse-
quently not be assured. To tackle this issue, we analyse the written
communication and press releases where three cantonal governments
advocated for the introduction of financial incentives. 
The position of municipalities in the overall Swiss federalist structure
of government is first briefly depicted hereafter (section 2). We then
give an overview of the ongoing reforms of the federalist structure (sec-
tion 3). This overview begins with a presentation of several dimensions
that must be adjusted when any change occurs in the structure. One of
these dimensions is the inter-jurisdiction and territorial organisation.
Disposable institutional settings to reorganise and reduce local frag-
mentation are presented accordingly, including inter-municipal arran-
gements and amalgamations. Certain relevant facts allow us to better
appreciate the importance of these two phenomenons. Finally, section
4 tests whether the fiscal equivalence principal is respected regarding
financial incentives allocated for the promotion of municipal amalga-
mation. 
2. The municipalities in the Swiss federalist structure
In Switzerland, as in many other countries, the public sector is organi-
sed according to three levels of government: Confederation (central
government), 26 cantons (equivalent to regions or provinces in other
countries) and 2740 municipalities1. Swiss municipalities are rather small
by international standards, with the average number of inhabitants at
roughly 2800. The median municipality accommodates approximately
900 inhabitants, with 20 inhabitants for the smallest compared to the
largest at almost 370’000 inhabitants in Zurich.
Relationships between the fiscal tiers are characterised by a profound
respect of the subsidiarity principle. This principle is embedded in the
170
1 When the “modern” Swiss Confederation was founded in 1848, there were 3203 muni-
cipalities. The figure had increased by 25 between 1850 and 1860. It had then slightly
fluctuated before a sharp fall between 1990 and 2006. 350 municipalities “disappe-
ared” during this spell of time and, in 2006, 2740 municipalities remained.
 
federal constitution, proclaiming cantons as legally sovereign states. They
exercise all rights that are not transferred to the federal level and are only
limited if explicitly stated in the Federal constitution2. The principle also
imbues the relationships between cantons and municipalities as stated
in most cantonal constitutions3.
This does not exclusively apply to designating the level of government
that has the power to decide and control over the provision of a specific
public service, or more specifically to decide if the power of decision must
be decentralised. It also applies to the choice of the level of government
adequately responsible for essentially producing and delivering the servi-
ce. The burden of producing and delivering a service, according to the stan-
dards set by the upper level, falls on the lower tier if that proves to offer
a more efficient result. Consequently, the obligation to provide the ser-
vice is either de-concentrated or delegated. This systematic de-concentration
characterises the alleged federalism of implementation4. Progressively, the
systematic decentralisation of the decision power, along with the syste-
matic task de-concentration of provided services, has generated a huge legal,
organisational, and financial interdependency between the three levels of
government. Conjointly, the miniature size of certain municipalities has
prevented the decentralisation of services or has prevented these muni-
cipalities from efficiently providing the decentralised services or from rea-
ching the standards of provision specified by the upper level.
Furthermore, a rather rigorous implementation of the fiscal equiva-
lence principle confers the constituencies at each level the power to rai-
se revenues according to their needs and thus set their own tax rates5.
As a result, even the existing equalisation scheme was not able to pre-
vent an increase in fiscal inequalities, with the gap amplified between
low tax-based/heavy tax-burdened and high tax-based/light tax-burde-
ned municipalities.
Comprehensively, within a limited perspective, a semi-direct demo-
cratic system has also prevailed at the local level. The population bene-
fits from a “law-making” or “law-breaking” power, notably with the right
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2 Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (April 18th, 1999)
3 Refer to articles 137 and 138 of the Cantonal constitution of the Canton of Vaud (Sep-
tember 22nd, 2002), for an example.
4 Fédéralisme d’exécution in French ou Verwaltungsföderalismus in German.
5 For instance, income is a tax base that the Confederation, the canton, and the muni-
cipality can independently decide upon its tax rate (“piggyback” tax sharing).
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to call for a referendum on regulation passed by the municipal legisla-
tive, or initiate a request for the introduction of a new regulation.
Identifying responsibilities through the study of government spending
is not evident. In reality, the cooperation among constituencies and the
decentralisation of responsibility to provide services, the de-concentration
of the task to deliver services to cantons or municipalities have triggered
a complex network of transfers (earmarked grants, unconditional grants,
revenue-sharing transfers, etc.)6. However, both the Confederation’s and
the cantons’ shares in overall public expenditures exceeds that of muni-
cipalities (11.2%, 15%, and 10% respectively of gross domestic product in
2006)7. More specifically, the overall budget of municipalities is more orien-
ted toward education, health care, and social services.
3. Ongoing reforms of the Swiss federalist structure
3.1. Dimensions to consider when reforming relationships between
and within tiers
Existing relationships between fiscal tiers, or within a given level of
government, form a delicate structure and an intricate equilibrium that
encompasses four broad dimensions or domains (Fig. 1). The modifi-
cations of one domain impact at least one of the three other dimensions,
requiring adjustments to create a new equilibrium. 
The current tendency in Switzerland concerns cantons withdrawing
responsibilities for providing (and even the obligation to produce and
deliver) public services at the municipal level (1), especially in areas like
schools, police, or hospitals. Cantons must eventually adjust the tax-sha-
ring arrangement with municipalities, since the cantons, contrary to the
municipalities, must finance the additional spending (2). As a result,
the cantonal tax rate increases, while simultaneously the liberty of
municipalities to decide their tax rate tends to lower, either under the
constraint of cantonal legislation or intermunicipal tax competition. A
172
6 Refer to discussions concerning the network of transfers between the Swiss Confe-
deration and the cantons (Dafflon ,1995), the canton of Bern and its municipali-
ties (Jeanrenaud and Spillman, 1997), the canton of Vaud and its municipalities
(Soguel and Tangerini, 2002), and finally the canton of Fribourg and its munici-
palities (Dafflon et al., 2004).
7 Département fédéral des finances / Federal department of finance (2006), without
correcting for the double-counting of transfer payments.
 
substitute or complementary solution is to adjust the grant scheme (3).
Several cantons have actually changed the extent to which they share
the cost of services, such as schools or health and social services, with
the municipal level through earmarked grants8. They have also someti-
mes required municipalities to pay a larger share of the cost. Within the
domain of transfers, the current trend is also to reinforce a fiscal equa-
lisation scheme to reduce inter-municipal imbalances. To obtain this objec-
tive, a horizontal component is introduced in the system next to the exis-
ting vertical component, mainly financed by wealthy municipalities in
favour predominantly of disadvantaged ones. For certain municipalities,
the shortage in tax revenue, due to the new tax-sharing arrangement con-
jointly with the increase in cost caused by the new cost-sharing arran-
gement, may not be fully compensated by possible new additional equa-
lisation transfers. Consequently, their fiscal position tends to deteriorate.
Increasing the tax rate is becoming increasingly difficult, since the popu-
lation can oppose the measure through a referendum. Another solution
is to change and reduce the fragmentation at the local level, in an
attempt notably to benefit from economies of scale (4).
Figure 1. The four dimensions of the equilibrium in relationships bet-
ween fiscal tiers or within a given level of government 
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8 These transfer payments are usually tailored to reflect the fiscal capacity of municipalities.
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3.2. Possible institutional settings to reduce local fragmentation
in Switzerland
When Swiss municipalities reflect upon the reduction of fragmentation
at the local level, several legal settings are at their disposal (Della Santa
1996). As shown on the horizontal axis of Figure 2, they vary according
to the scope of services covered. In addition, they also vary according
to the intensity of the democratic control and the type of grouping they
imply (displayed on the vertical axis).
Figure 2. Possible institutional settings to reduce Swiss local frag-
mentation
When contracting-out, the municipality usually outsources a single
public service (ex. to a private firm or a neighbouring municipality). The
contract obliges the appointee to provide the public service on behalf of
the municipality. The purchaser/provider split (technical delegation)
limits the possibility for the municipality to control in detail the orga-
nisation of the production9.
174
9 Note that contracting-out and privatisation are often used synonymously, especially
in the United States (refer to Domberger and Simon 1997 for an attempt to make a
distinction).
 
When engaging in a single-purposed inter-municipal agreement or
association, a municipality also delegates the task to provide a single ser-
vice. However, the municipality retains at least partial control on how
the service is produced. Its representatives are either members of the inter-
municipal commission in the case of an agreement, or of the board of
the inter-municipal association. Nevertheless, this kind of administra-
tive grouping implies a loss of democratic control, since the municipa-
lity is merely one among several to have authority in either the commission
or the board. As a result, citizens of the municipality are left with little
influence on local public services and thus democratic accountability
is lowered. The multi-purposed inter-municipal agreement or associa-
tion presents the same characteristics as the single-purposed, while pro-
viding a larger scope of related services.
Municipal amalgamation (or merger) is the uniting of a number of
small municipalities, or annexation by a large community or city of its
neighbouring smaller townships, villages or towns (Mabuchi 2001). It
guarantees a better democratic accountability than inter-municipal
arrangements, since there is no separation between the jurisdiction pur-
chasing and the one supplying the service. The newly-created munici-
pality has its own elected legislative and executive bodies jointly with
its own administration. They are accountable to a unique body of citi-
zens for the provision of the overall scope of services a municipality is
responsible for. 
There is a tendency to introduce the possibility to create an intermediate
tier between the municipal and the cantonal levels in cantonal legisla-
tion. The possibility to establish a supposed agglomeration already exists
in some cantons (e. g. the canton of Vaud or the canton of Fribourg),
although no agglomeration project has presently reached the imple-
mentation stage. As its name indicates, the agglomeration is dedicated
to solving problems encountered in an urban area and is equivalent to
an urban community in other countries. The agglomeration is basically
created when municipalities belonging to the agglomeration agree to trans-
fer their responsibility to decide over a bunch of given services in an effort
towards centralisation. Therefore, the agglomeration becomes respon-
sible for specific services that are legally delegated by the canton to the
municipalities. It enjoys certain revenue-raising power with user char-
ges. Like the amalgamated municipality, the agglomeration represents
a political group, because of its respective elected legislative and execu-
tive bodies. 
U
rb
an
 P
u
bl
ic
 E
co
n
om
ic
s 
R
ev
ie
w
| 
 R
ev
is
ta
 d
e 
Ec
on
om
ía
 P
úb
li
ca
 U
rb
an
a
177
In theory and as far as technical efficiency is concerned, all these options
lead to economies of scale. However, the expectation is possibly lower for
the amalgamation, since returns to scale may decrease for various public
services with particularly low fixed costs. On the contrary, other options
can limit their scope to services produced under increased returns to sca-
le. This concerns especially services with indivisible supply, because of
the infrastructure needed to provide them. They also allow for larger eco-
nomies of scope when cost-savings arise from by-products in the decision
and the production process. An example would be the benefits of heat-
ing public premises with energy produced while incinerating wastes. At
the same time, these options generate higher transaction costs, including
administration costs in addition to incomplete contract costs, than the
amalgamation. This is particularly the case of an agglomeration, since
an additional level of government must be created.
As for the allocative efficiency, political groupings, such as agglo-
merations and amalgamations, internalise jurisdictional spillovers of local
public goods and “crowding” spillovers, since they promote a better
superimposition between the three circles of budgetary policy: those who
decide, those who benefit, and those who pay. Coincidentally, such
groupings can lower the citizens’ satisfaction with local public services
if their preferences for these services are comparatively heterogeneous.
Ad hoc technical delegation or administrative groups, providing servi-
ces for which preferences are notoriously homogeneous, joined with a
municipal provision of services for which preferences are predominantly
heterogeneous, represent a more efficient solution.
From a viewpoint of equity, political groupings allow the reduction
of horizontal fiscal imbalances and tax competition, thus harmonising
tax burdens beyond the achievement of any possible horizontal or verti-
cal equalisation scheme. In turn, this reduces the risk of under-provision
of public services, such as welfare benefits, that may emerge when juris-
dictions providing better quality services attract residents from other
jurisdictions. The possible risk may trigger a strategic game whereby a muni-
cipality sets the quality of services too low from a social perspective in
order to reduce the expected threat of service-induced migration. 
3.3. Inter-municipal cooperation: relevant facts
In Switzerland, the inter-municipal cooperation has a long history. Al-
ready in the mid-19th century, small-sized municipalities associated
themselves to provide specific local services. The comparatively large auto-
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nomy that municipalities have experienced by international standards
explains the popularity of this form of organisation in an attempt to redu-
ce local fragmentation. 
The results of two mail-surveys aided us to formulate how munici-
palities tried to lessen local fragmentation (Steiner and Ladner, 2003,
2005). The first survey occurred in 1998, while the second took place in
2005. Among various questions, every Swiss municipality (i.e. the muni-
cipal clerk) was asked (a) whether its involvement is recently greater in
inter-municipal arrangements than in the past, (b) whether the possi-
bility of an amalgamation was a political issue, and (c) whether the muni-
cipality was concretely involved in an amalgamation project during the
last five years.
Table 1 shows the results of both surveys. In 2005, 72% of the 2150 res-
ponding municipalities indicated a growing importance of inter-muni-
cipal arrangements for the provision of public services, an increase from
63% in 1998. In each considered size-category, more than half of the res-
pondents mentioned that these arrangements have developed progres-
sively. However, the increase appeared to be more evident in larger muni-
cipalities than in smaller ones. The rise was also predominant in services
like fire protection, waste management, sewage, water provision, or
health care.
Apart from these facts, the results of both surveys showed a severe
increase in the number of respondents that claim their municipality 
either has discussed the issue of a possible amalgamation, or has been
involved in an amalgamation project. Twice as many municipalities
have considered this option in 2005 compared to 1998 (39% against 18%),
whereas the number of municipalities involved in such a project during
the five years before 2005 has tripled since 1998 (23% against 8%). The
amalgamation is a long process that comprises several stages, as shown
by Soguel & Beutler (2006). From the responses obtained, Steiner and
Ladner made the distinction between several states of amalgamation pro-
jects. 5% were successfully implemented between 2001 and 2005. 1% were
approved at the legislative level (including sometimes a referendum),
but had not been implemented yet. 10% were at an earlier stage and had
notably studied the pros and the cons of a possible amalgamation.
Finally, 8% failed either at an early stage (technical stage) or at a later
stage (political stage, including referendum). Eventually one out of
three projects failed. This high rate of failure may indicate that amal-
gamations do not provide advantages in excess of the implied costs, but
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also shows the difficulty to persuade local politicians and voters to
accept an amalgamation, even though a technical assessment may high-
light the generated net benefits for the population.
Table 1. Change in the share of Swiss municipalities involved in
inter-municipal arrangements or amalgamation processes betwe-
en 1998 and 2005
1998 2005
n % N n % N
Arrangement 1,540 63 2,445 1,548 72 2,150
Amalgamation
Discussion 438 18 2,432 838 39 2,165
Project 193 8 2,412 462 23 2,008
Implemented amalgamations 100 5
Approved amalgamations 20 1
Amalgamations under assessement 203 10
Failed projects 163 8
Source : Steiner and Ladner (2003, 2005).
Note : N = number of municipalities that answered the question; n = number of municipalities
than positively answered the question; % = 100n/N. 2899 municipalities were surveyed in 1998
and 2763 in 2005.
Figure 3 is particularly interesting for its demonstration, to a certain
extent, of the practical validity of the economic canonical contentions
in favour of amalgamation, or at least in favour of a defragmentation
at the local level. Indeed, the results reveal, according to the size, the
frequency of municipalities involved in a preliminary discussion, or in
a project of amalgamation, between 2001 and 2005. 
The frequency is higher in small-sized municipalities (on the left side
of the figure) and in larger municipalities (on the right side). A theore-
tical interpretation of these relevant facts possibly reveals that smaller
municipalities are most interested to amalgamate in an attempt to rea-
lise economies of scale together with economies of scope, while redu-
cing transactions costs induced by inter-municipal arrangement. They
also are interested in amalgamating to recover part of the political con-
trol lost while taking part in inter-municipal arrangements. Furthermore,
they wish to reduce the professed “democratic shortage” that charac-
terise administrative groupings.
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In addition, larger municipalities and cities are more interested than
medium-sized ones to merge with neighbouring municipalities in the aim
to reduce jurisdictional spillovers, fiscal unbalance, and tax competition. 
Figure 3. Frequency of municipalities involved in a preliminary dis-
cussion or in a project of amalgamation, according to size, between
2001 and 2005
Source : Steiner and Ladner (2003, 2005).
Note : Ñ = approximate average number of municipalities that answered to both questions (dis-
cussion and/or project of amalgamation)
4.The role of Swiss cantons in territorial reforms: an analysis of
financial incentives to improve the attractiveness of amalgamation
An increasing number of Swiss cantons offer financial contributions to
municipalities that amalgamate10. The movement was initially initia-
ted by the canton of Fribourg and presently about a fourth of the 26 Swiss
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10 In Finland, Japan, and Norway the higher government tier also often contributes
financially to improve the attractiveness of amalgamation (Joumar and Kongsrud
2003, p.24).
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cantons have introduced such a policy. The financial contribution
usually accounts for about 250 per inhabitant (400 CHF). The can-
ton of Luzern even decided to guarantee that the new municipality
would not have to impose a higher tax burden than the pre-existing muni-
cipality enforcing the lowest tax burden11.
What are the motivations of these cantons in allocating budget
resources to such a policy? Following the fiscal equivalence principle and
according to Lindhal (1919), the tax burden should be shared among indi-
viduals in accordance with the utility of the policy to individuals. In addi-
tion, the group of payers should match the group of beneficiaries, or the
alleged users. In other words, the formers’ contribution to the govern-
ment’s budget corresponds supposedly to the benefit provided by the Sta-
te’s policy. Concerning the incentives related to amalgamation, the fis-
cal equivalence conveys that the cantonal government allocates funds
only if the benefit for the cantonal community (citizens at the canto-
nal level wherever they live) matches the incurred costs (taxes paid by
cantonal tax-payers, notably through cantonal income tax), as shown
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The fiscal equivalence principle applied to the financial
incentives allocated to amalgamating municipalities by the cantonal
government
Source: Soguel and Chatagny (2006).
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11 Refer to Robert-Progin and Gigandet (2006) for a survey of existing incentive mecha-
nisms in the cantons of Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Jura.
 
In order to test the hypothesis that fiscal equivalence is truly respected,
we analysed laws, messages, programmes, and press releases of the
government’s explanation and rationale in introducing incentives pro-
moting amalgamations. Bern, Fribourg, and Neuchâtel were the cantons
retained, because of our opportunity to participate as consultants on con-
crete amalgamation projects. Incorporating three cantons allowed us to
list a large array of contentions justifying existing policies. For each con-
tention, the analysis established the plausible relationship to the overall
cantonal community or, on the contrary, its exclusive and direct lineage
to amalgamating municipalities. Additionally, we note that certain con-
tentions may concern simultaneously the cantonal community and amal-
gamating municipalities.
Table 2 illustrates the results in five groups that correspond to various
axes representing the means of strategical assessment of an amalgama-
tion project (Soguel and Léchot 2006). Three axes focus on global
impacts: (a) the development and leadership of the municipality as a
result of the amalgamation; (b) the overall fiscal position; (c) the citi-
zens’ identification12 and opinion. Two other axes exemplify the effect
concerning the provision of any single public service: (d) the allocati-
ve efficiency (capacity to take utility-maximising decision), (e) the pro-
ductive efficiency (capacity to minimise to use of productive resources).
Regarding the development and leadership of a municipality, the
analysed texts expose four contentions justifying a financial incentive.
In one canton (BE-Bern), amalgamation is expected to favour sustainable
development to the benefit of the cantonal community (C). In addition,
a greater facility to recruit militia politicians, staff executive, and legis-
lative bodies (to the benefit of the sole amalgamating municipality-
AM) is anticipated. The capacity of the municipality to negotiate with
the canton, or with neighbouring municipalities, is equally envisioned
to increase, due to an augmentation in its economic and demographic
weight, which benefits both the canton and the amalgamating muni-
cipality. At the same time, municipal competitiveness could be increa-
sed, assisting the municipality to take advantage of opportunities, or avoid
risks associated with the evolution of the environment (municipality’s
benefit).
Five contentions belong to the axis of the fiscal position: (a) impro-
vement of the municipal overall fiscal position; (b) enlargement of the
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12 Or the “sense of attachment to community” (Kushner & Siegel 2003, p.55).
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tax base, due to a reduction in tax competition; (c) reduction of the tax
burden; (d) higher cash-flow generation allowing to self-finance invest-
ment projects; (e) strengthening the equalisation scheme if the muni-
cipality becomes more wealthy due to the amalgamation, therefore trig-
gering a lower cash-drain on the system.
The last contention represents a benefit of the overall cantonal com-
munity, while the other four along this axis contrarily favour amalga-
mating municipalities.
Concerning the citizens’ identification, the cantonal government of
Bern acknowledges that an amalgamation may cause an individual to
lose its personal sense of attachment to community. However, the can-
tonal unity is simultaneously reinforced, because of the reduction of frag-
mentation at the local level.
Table 2. Cantonal governments’ contentions in favour of a financial
support for amalgamating municipalities
Axes Contention BE FR NE
C AM C AM C AM
Development 
& leadership
Sustainable + •
development
Recruitment of • •
militia politicians
Capacity of • + + •
negotiation
Competitiveness •
Fiscal 
position
Overall fiscal • + •
position
Tax base •
Tax burden • •
Cash flow •
generation
Equalisation + +
scheme
182
Table 2 (cont.)
Axes Contention BE FR NE
C AM C AM C AM
Citizens’ 
identification
Local identity +
Allocative 
efficiency
Autonomy • • •
Consulting +
and controlling
Democratic control • •
Coordination • •
Fiscal responsibility • • •
Productive 
efficiency
Global economies + • • •
of scale
Economies of •
scale in HR
Supervision •
Economies of scope •
Delegation of tasks + • + •
Total 6 12 3 12 2 6
Source: Soguel and Chatagny (2006).
Note: C = contention in favour of the cantonal community; AM = contention in favour of amal-
gamating municipalities; BE = canton of Bern; FR = canton of Fribourg; NE = canton of Neuchâ-
tel; HR = human resources; + = contention in favour of the canton; •= contention in favour of
amalgamating municipality.
In allocative efficiency, contentions are relatively those provided by
the theory of fiscal federalism. The contention of autonomy refers to
the ability of the municipality to prepare and take decisions without
the obligation to use external advice (e.g. from a consultant). The need
for the canton to act as an advisor is also lessened mutually with the
need to exert control over municipal decisions. The perspectives for
democratic control, fiscal responsibility, and better coordination of the
decision with neighbouring municipalities are expected to be reinfor-
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ced. However, apart from a reduction of cantonal consulting and con-
trol, all of these contentions benefit essentially the amalgamating
municipality.
Contentions for productive efficiency also correspond to those of
fiscal federalism. Economies of scale (especially concerning human
resources), economies of scope, an increased capacity to supervise the
production and delivery of public services are generally mentioned as
benefiting amalgamating municipalities. However, in the canton of
Bern, the fact that an amalgamation allows economies of scale is con-
sidered an advantage for the cantonal community as well, due to the
benefits, through the grant system, of lower costs of delegated public
services at the municipal level. Furthermore, this increased efficiency
allows the canton to delegate the task of providing additional public
services to municipalities.
To summarise, the contentions that amalgamating municipalities pro-
fit from are often cited by several cantonal governments: autonomy, fis-
cal responsibility, economies of scale (all 3 cantons), recruitment of mili-
tia politicians, capacity of negotiation, overall fiscal position, tax burden,
democratic control, coordination, and delegation of tasks (2 cantons).
On the contrary, for contentions that benefit the cantonal community,
only the equalisation scheme and the delegation of tasks are mentioned
in two cantons.
The bottom of the table calculates the number of occurrences of the
various contentions in each column. The weight of every single contention
is therefore implicitly equal. An imbalance appears towards the advan-
tages of amalgamating municipalities. The contentions are two to four
times more numerous for municipalities than for the cantonal com-
munity13. These results highlight that the policy of the cantonal govern-
ment is less motivated by benefits for the cantonal community than by
the advantages for amalgamating municipalities, at least in the short-
term and regarding direct benefits. We can consequently conclude that
payers of cantonal taxes finance a policy that they do not profit from
substantially, but rather the citizens of amalgamating municipalities.
Therefore, if a person resides in a municipality that will never amalga-
mate (e.g. a wealthy municipality), she will marginally, or rather indi-
rectly, benefit from the policy.
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13 There are 6 to 12 contentions for the canton of Bern and 3 to 12 for the canton of
Fribourg.
 
5. Conclusion
In Switzerland, the ongoing reforms of fiscal federalism are inclined to
put municipalities under increased fiscal stress. A majority of the muni-
cipalities respond to this situation by increasing the cooperation with
neighbouring municipalities. In 2005, more than 72% of Swiss muni-
cipalities indicated a growing importance of inter-municipal arrange-
ments for the provision of public services compared to the situation five
years before. Simultaneously almost 40% discussed the issue of a pos-
sible amalgamation and 23% have been involved in such a project. This
has respectively doubled and tripled in the number of municipalities com-
pared to 1998 (18% and 8%). Roughly, about a fifth of the projects have
already been successful, half are still ongoing and a third failed. Small-
sized and larger municipalities tend to be more frequently involved in
such project than medium-sized ones. The smaller municipality is pos-
sibly more interested in realising economies of scale together with eco-
nomies of scope, while reducing transactions costs induced by inter-muni-
cipal arrangement, whereas the larger one may principally expect a
reduction in jurisdictional spillovers, fiscal unbalance, and tax compe-
tition.
Conversely, this trend towards amalgamation has undoubtedly been
triggered by the financial contribution, allocated by several cantonal
governments, to amalgamating municipalities. The governments’ con-
tentions in favour of such a policy prove to be rather biased toward the
interest of amalgamating municipalities. As a result, according to the
governments’ perspective, the cantonal community benefits to a lower
degree. One of the few contentions clearly noted as an advantage for the
cantonal community is that the existing equalisation scheme would be
strengthened if an amalgamating municipality became wealthy and trig-
gered consequently a lower cash-drain on the system. Another conten-
tion is that amalgamation increases efficiency, possibly allowing the can-
ton to delegate the provision of additional public services to municipalities.
These results demonstrate that the policy of the cantonal government
is less motivated by benefits for the cantonal community than those of
amalgamating municipalities with regards to short-term direct benefits.
One can thus conclude that the payers of cantonal taxes pay the bene-
fits of the citizens of amalgamated municipalities rather than themselves.
This discrepancy is a potential source of inequity between the payers of
cantonal taxes living in municipalities that will never amalgamate (e.g.
wealthy municipalities), yet indirectly benefiting from the policy, and
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those living in amalgamating municipalities directly profiting from the
policy.
Indeed, a certain form of inequality between these two groups of tax-
payers may be necessary to reduce the possible inequality between muni-
cipalities that amalgamate with each other.
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